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Abstract 
 
Two experiments investigated the hypothesis that strategic behavioral mimicry can facilitate 
negotiation outcomes.  Study 1 used an employment negotiation with multiple issues, and 
demonstrated that strategic behavioral mimicry facilitated outcomes at both the individual and 
dyadic levels: Negotiators who mimicked the mannerisms of their opponents both secured better 
individual outcomes and their dyads as a whole also performed better when mimicking occurred 
compared to when it did not.  Thus, mimickers created more value and then claimed most of that 
additional value for themselves, though not at the expense of their opponents.  In Study 2, mimicry 
facilitated negotiators’ ability to uncover underlying compatible interests and increased the 
likelihood of obtaining a deal in a negotiation where a prima facie solution was not possible.  
Results from Study 2 also demonstrated that interpersonal trust mediated the relationship between 
mimicry and deal-making.  Implications for our understanding of negotiation dynamics and 
interpersonal coordination are discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Mimicry, negotiations, conflict resolution, interpersonal behavior, decision-making, 
automaticity 
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A negotiation is an inherently interpersonal interaction.  Although negotiations are often 
limited by numerical parameters, final outcomes are largely dependent upon one’s ability to 
influence, persuade, and interact effectively with one’s opponents (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991; 
Bazerman & Neale, 1992).  Thus, it is not surprising that interpersonal variables, such as liking, 
trust, familiarity, and rapport are associated with more favorable negotiation outcomes, particularly 
in negotiations with the potential for integrative solutions (i.e., solutions that expand the total 
amount of the resources available to both parties) (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Thompson, 2005).  
Building trust and a positive relationship with the other party is often a precursor to increased 
information-sharing, which is arguably the most effective means of securing mutually beneficial 
settlements (Fisher, et al., 1991; Thompson, 1991).  
However, establishing a positive relationship within a negotiation setting is easier said than 
done: Negotiations typically involve the distribution of limited resources, making them fraught 
with incentives for competition, withholding of information, distrust, and conflict, particularly 
among negotiators interacting for the first time.  Many people tend to expect deceit and competition 
within negotiation settings, and individuals often enter negotiations expecting and preparing for the 
worst (e.g. Fisher et al., 1991).  Yet given the critical role that cooperation and information-sharing 
have in securing negotiation outcomes, effective negotiators must find a tenuous balance between 
facilitating positive and cooperative interactions within a competitive and often distrustful 
environment.  This necessary balancing of competition and cooperation has been dubbed the 
‘negotiator’s dilemma’ (Lax & Sebenius, 1986).  One critical question for negotiators, then, is how 
can a positive connection be established quickly enough to have a positive impact during the short 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
                                                                                             Mimicry and Negotiations 
 
4 
time frame in which negotiations often occur, but be simple enough so that negotiators do not lose 
focus on the issues on the table?   
One easy and effective way of facilitating interpersonal interactions is via behavioral 
mimicry.  Research suggests that people naturally tend to mimic others in a variety of ways: We 
mimic others’ accents and speech patterns, facial expressions, overt behaviors, and affective 
responses (see Chartrand, Maddux, & Lakin, 2005, for a review).   Importantly, most of the time 
people mimic each other without ever consciously realizing it; we simply seem to have an innate 
tendency to do what others do.  Researchers have demonstrated that individuals mimic others’ 
overt mannerisms in even the most minimal of circumstances, and that confederates who 
intentionally mimic the mannerisms of experimental participants are liked more than those 
confederates who do not mimic (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).   
However, mimicry tends to occur to a greater extent for individuals who are especially 
motivated to get along with others.  Individuals who have a strong need to affiliate (Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003), those who have an interdependent self-construal (Van Baaren, Maddux, 
Chartrand, de Bouter, and Van Knippenberg, 2003), those high in perspective-taking (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999), and those high in self-monitoring (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003) exhibit more 
interpersonal mimicry than those who do not possess these motivations.  Additional research 
suggests that mimicry occurs across a variety of naturalistic settings, particularly among 
individuals who have a bond with each other.  For example, among romantic couples there is a 
robust association between the amount of rapport they feel with each other and the amount of 
mimicking that takes place during their interactions (Bernieri, 1988; see also LaFrance & 
Broadbent, 1976; LaFrance, 1979, 1982 for related work).   
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Other research has demonstrated the benefits of consciously and strategically mimicking the 
behaviors of others to facilitate certain desired outcomes.  In one study waitresses who were 
instructed to verbally mimic their customers (by repeating the orders back verbatim) received 
bigger tips than those who were instructed not to mimic (Van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & Van 
Knippenberg, 2003).  In addition, being behaviorally mimicked in an initial interaction with 
someone increases the chances that individuals will perform an altruistic behavior in a subsequent 
context (Van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & Van Knippenberg, 2004).  Given these compelling 
results, some researchers have postulated that mimicry seems to serve as a type of ‘social glue’ that 
helps ‘bind and bond’ people together, and that it can be used strategically for such purposes 
(Chartrand et al., 2005).   
Overall, results from previous research provide suggestive evidence that strategically 
mimicking the overt mannerisms of one’s negotiation opponent may also prove beneficial in a 
negotiation context.  If strategic mimicry can facilitate the interpersonal coordination of 
negotiators, this may open the channels of communication, allowing more information exchange 
and subsequently facilitating more efficient and effective deals for dyads as a whole (often referred 
to as ‘value-creating’).  In addition, negotiators who actually perform the mimicking may have an 
advantage in eliciting information from the other (mimicked) party by putting their opponent at 
ease and leading the mimicked party to trust the mimicker.  Indeed, feelings of trust for the other 
party are a prerequisite for a negotiator to share information about their priorities (Kimmel, Pruitt, 
Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980; Butler, 1999).  Thus, an advantage in eliciting 
information about the other side’s priorities may also lead mimickers to be able to achieve better 
deals for themselves (often referred to as ‘value-claiming.’)  Lax and Sebenius (1986, p.33) adeptly 
described this relationship between value creation and value claiming: “Value creating and value 
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claiming are linked parts of a negotiation…value that has been created must be claimed…there is 
more value to be claimed if one has helped create it first.”  Thus, we predicted that mimicking 
would provide negotiators with advantages in value-creating and value-claiming.   
Although strategic mimicry has previously been found to be beneficial for the mimicker 
(e.g. Van Baaren et al., 2003; 2004) such investigations have focused on relatively simple 
behaviors such as tipping in a restaurant, or picking up dropped pens.  Thus, it is currently unclear 
the extent to which mimicry can facilitate other types of more complex interpersonal interactions.  
In particular, negotiations necessitate a high level of cognitive engagement, and complex decisions 
need to be made within a high-pressure environment between parties who may have little or no 
knowledge about each other, but where the stakes can be high, and where there are strong 
incentives for competition, withholding of information, distrust, and conflict. Thus, negotiation 
contexts provide a strong and compelling test of the limits of mimicry’s potential interpersonal 
benefits.   
Study 1 
Method  
Participants.  Participants were 104 MBA students (72 men, 36 women) at a large business 
school enrolled in a negotiations course.   
Negotiation task.  We used an employment negotiation exercise between a job candidate 
and a recruiter that involved eight issues (Neale, 1997).  Negotiators’ preferences were created by 
assigning points to each issue, with a higher number of points indicating a stronger preference.  Of 
the eight issues, two issues were purely distributive (the parties’ preferences were in complete 
opposition), two issues were compatible (the parties’ preferences were identical), and the remaining 
four issues had integrative potential: the candidate had a stronger preference for two of these issues, 
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whereas the recruiter had a stronger preference for the other two.  Within this negotiation, then, 
parties could “create value” and earn more points if they conceded on the two issues of low 
importance to them in exchange for the two issues of high importance to them than if they simply 
compromised and chose the midpoint for each of the four issues.  Thus, reaching a good deal in this 
exercise is largely contingent upon cooperation and information-sharing.  Negotiators who are able 
to discern the other side’s preferences can make trade-offs (i.e., make concessions on issues that are 
of low priority to themselves but high priority to the other party), and expand the number of points 
available to both parties.  In addition, by understanding the other side’s priorities, an astute 
negotiator can offer trade-offs and deals that benefit (or at least not adversely affect) the other side 
but also leave themselves much better off as well.  Through information gathering, then, 
negotiators can both create and claim value.  
Procedure.  One week prior to the negotiation, participants were given confidential role 
instructions and told to prepare for their roles by themselves.  The negotiation instructions 
indicated that participants’ objective was to maximize their point total.  Participants performed the 
negotiation at the beginning of class the following week and were given up to 30 minutes to 
negotiate.   
Experimental manipulations.  Dyads were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 conditions.  In one 
condition the candidate was instructed to mimic the mannerisms of the recruiter; in another 
condition the recruiter was instructed to mimic the candidate; in a third condition neither negotiator 
was instructed to mimic (control condition).  Thus, there was a maximum of one mimicker per 
dyad in the two mimicking conditions, and no mimickers in the control condition.   
At the beginning of class and approximately 5 minutes before the negotiation exercise 
began, participants were given an “important message” and were instructed that the message was 
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part of the negotiation exercise they were about to perform.  In each of the two mimicking 
conditions, the message read as follows:   
 
Successful negotiators recommend that you should mimic the mannerisms of your negotiation 
partner to get a better deal.  For example, when the other person rubs his/her face, you should 
too.  If he/she leans back or leans forward in the chair, you should too.  However, they say it is 
very important that you mimic subtly enough that the other person does not notice what you are 
doing, otherwise this technique completely backfires.  Also, do not direct too much of your 
attention to the mimicking so you don’t lose focus on the outcome of the negotiation.  Thus, 
you should find a happy medium of consistent but subtle mimicking that does not disrupt your 
focus.  
 
In contrast, participants in the control condition received the following message: “Many 
successful negotiators recommend focusing on the information in your planning document, and to 
negotiate with this always in the back of your mind.  They say that this will help get you through 
the negotiations and get a good deal.”  This information was redundant with information given to 
all students in previous classes, and all students, regardless of condition, had been asked to prepare 
a planning document (a preparation sheet explicitly laying out their individual strategies) 
beforehand.  Participants opposing a negotiator who had been instructed to mimic were also given 
the control message.  Participants were given 5 minutes to read and think about how to incorporate 
their important message instructions into their negotiation strategy.  Participants then negotiated 
together in private rooms.   
Manipulation Checks and Dependent Measures.  Following the negotiation, participants 
were asked to recall the “important message” instructions they received before the negotiation.  A 
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second question assessed the percentage of time that participants had actively followed their 
“important message” instructions (response options ranged from 0% to 100% of the time).  This 
also served as an independent measure of the extent to which mimicking actually took place during 
the negotiation.  
We had two primary outcome measures.  The first was the total number of points the 
individuals in each dyad achieved together, often referred to as joint gain (possible range: -8,400 
points to 13,200 points). This measure captures the degree to which parties “created value” by 
discovering mutually beneficial tradeoffs and enlarging the number of points that were available to 
both sides.  The second measure looked at individual gain, or the total number of points that each 
side obtained individually, which measures the degree to which parties “claimed value” for 
themselves. 
Results 
Manipulation checks.  All participants correctly recalled their important message.  
Participants who were instructed to mimic actively followed their mimicking instructions an 
average of 32.9% of the time during the negotiation (SD = 24.79; responses ranged from 5% to 
80%).   
 Joint gain.  All dyads reached an agreement in this exercise.  Our first analysis assessed joint 
gain by summing the individual outcome scores of the negotiators in each dyad and submitting this 
measure to a one-way ANOVA.  Results revealed a significant effect for mimicking condition on 
joint gain, F(2, 49) = 4.02, p = .02, η2p = .14.  When either the candidate or the recruiter mimicked 
their opponent, the dyad earned higher joint gain (M = 12,511.76, SD = 850.23) relative to when no 
one in the dyad mimicked their opponent (M = 11,738.89, SD = 1,440.24), F(1, 49) = 6.06, p = .02, 
η2p = .11.  However, there was no significant difference in joint gain as a function of whether the 
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candidate (M = 12,266.67, SD = 1,012.86) or the recruiter mimicked their opponent (M = 
12,787.50, SD = 523.93), F(1, 32) = 3.41, p = .074. 
We also examined joint gain as a function of the actual amount of mimicking that took place, 
and this was positively correlated with joint gain, r(52) = .372, p = .007.  Thus, the more 
participants mimicked their opponents, the more points negotiators were able to make available to 
both parties. 
Individual gain. We then proceeded to examine how this increase in joint gain occurred by 
analyzing individual gain for each party as a function of experimental condition, controlling for the 
effect of the opposing party’s individual gain.  Thus, we ran two separate one-way ANCOVAs with 
condition as our independent variable and either 1) candidate individual gain, or 2) recruiter 
individual gain as our dependent measure, and with opponent’s individual gain as a covariate.  
Results for recruiter individual-gain showed a significant effect for mimicking condition 
F(2, 48) = 4.45, p = .017, η2p = .15.  Continuing to control for opponents’ individual gain, mean 
comparisons indicated that the recruiter secured significantly more points when he/she mimicked 
(M = 6,431.25, SD = 1,564.06) than when the candidate mimicked, (M = 5,638.89, SD = 1,384.43), 
(F(1, 31) = 6.46, p = .016, η2p = .17, and significantly more individual points compared to the 
control condition in which neither party mimicked, (M = 5,611.11, SD = 1,927.78), F(1, 31) = 7.49, 
p = .01, η2p = .20 (see Figure 1).   
Analyses for the individual gain for the candidate were conducted in the same manner, and 
results also showed a significant effect for mimicking condition F(2, 48) = 3.36, p = .043, η2p = 
.12.  Mean comparisons indicated that the candidate secured more points when he/she mimicked 
(M = 6,627.78, SD = 1,913.97) than when the recruiter mimicked, (M = 6,356.25, SD = 1,638.69), 
F(1, 31) = 4.00, p = .054, η2p = .11, and significantly more points compared to the control, (M = 
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6,127.78, SD = 1,920.42), F(1, 31) = 5.57, p = .025, η2p = .15 (see Figure 1).  Thus, the increase in 
joint gain for both parties resulted from increases in individual gain by whichever of the two parties 
actually performed the mimicking.   
However, additional mean comparisons indicated that being mimicked did not adversely 
affect one’s individual gain.  There was no difference in the recruiter’s individual gain in the 
control condition compared to the condition where the candidate mimicked, p > .32.  In addition, 
there was no difference in the candidate’s individual gain in the condition where the recruiter 
mimicked compared to the control condition, p > .21 (see Figure 1.)  In sum, then, mimicry had 
positive overall benefits for the dyad by increasing joint gain (i.e., mimicry facilitated value-
creating tactics).  In addition, mimicry enhanced benefits for the party doing the mimicking (i.e., 
value-claiming), but it did not adversely affect the party being mimicked.   
Study 2 
 The main goal for Study 2 was to conceptually replicate results from Study 1 in a 
qualitatively different type of negotiation setting, and to test the underlying psychological 
mechanism that accounts for the beneficial effects of mimicry on negotiated outcomes.  Results 
from Study 1 suggest that negotiators who mimic create more value than negotiators who do not 
mimic.  Presumably this is because mimicking leads to increased cooperation and information 
sharing that, in turn, facilitates value-creation in a negotiation.  In addition, the advantage held by 
mimicking negotiators (as opposed to mimicked negotiators) in claiming value suggested that they 
are better able to extract information and concessions from the other side and use this information 
to create agreements that are especially valuable to them.  In Study 2, we tested the generalizability 
of this effect by employing a negotiation where a prima facie deal appears impossible, but where 
one party’s ability to extract information allows both parties to reach a deal.   
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We also sought to explore the underlying dynamics of how mimicry facilitated outcomes by 
investigating the potential effects of interpersonal variables such as trust, liking, and rapport.  As 
far as the authors are aware, no previous investigations on the effects of mimicry have 
demonstrated the mediating effect of an interpersonal variable (e.g., trust, liking) on a behavioral 
outcome variable (e.g., deal-making, tipping.)  However, results from Study 1 suggest that the 
advantage that mimicking negotiators have may be the result of their opponents trusting or liking 
them more, and this in turn may facilitate information sharing and thus final outcomes.  We sought 
to further explore these underlying, interpersonal dynamics in Study 2.   
Overview.  Study 2 was a dyadic negotiation exercise involving the sale of a gas station.  In 
this negotiation, a deal based solely on the price of the gas station was impossible: According to the 
information in the roles, the buyer’s reservation price (the maximum he/she was authorized to pay) 
of $500,000 was substantially lower than the seller’s reservation price (the minimum he/she was 
willing to accept) of $553,000.  Thus, the negotiation was one involving a “negative bargaining 
zone,” a negotiation where the seller’s reservation price is higher than the buyer’s reservation price.  
In other words, there was no overlap in the amount of money each party was willing to buy or sell 
the station for (i.e. there was no overlap in reservation prices.)  However, the underlying interests 
or motivations of the parties were compatible: In addition to desiring to purchase the station, the 
buyer was also interested in hiring managers to run the station in the future, whereas the seller (who 
had been an excellent manager of the station over the past five years) desired to sell the station but 
also needed to obtain employment after returning from a trip.  Thus, a deal was possible if parties 
were able to recognize these common underlying interests, and structure a creative solution that 
included issues other than simply the sale price of the station.  For example, parties could agree to a 
sale price below the seller’s reservation price (e.g. $495,000), but with a stipulation that the seller 
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would work as a manager upon returning from the trip, with the value of the future salary giving 
the seller a deal that would meet or exceed his/her reservation price.   
Adding to the complexity of this negotiation is the fact that the seller is particularly 
desperate to get a deal; he/she is suffering from burnout and wants to sell the station immediately 
so he/she can sail around the world with his/her spouse, but also needs to obtain employment upon 
his/her return.  Thus, achieving a deal is largely dependent on whether the seller feels comfortable 
sharing this sensitive information; only then can the potential buyer structure a creative agreement 
that can satisfy both parties’ needs. 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 62 full-time M.B.A. students (44 males, 16 females) who 
were enrolled in a negotiations class.   
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to dyads playing the role of either buyer 
or seller.  One week prior to the negotiation, participants were given confidential role instructions 
for the negotiation and told to prepare for their roles by themselves.  Participants were given 45 
minutes in class the following week to negotiate. 
Experimental manipulations.  All participants received an ‘important message’ immediately 
prior to the negotiation, and were told that the message was part of their role materials.  
Participants in both conditions were given the same respective messages as in Study 1; participants 
in the mimicry condition were told to strategically mimic their partners, whereas the control 
participants were given the important message encouraging them to focus on their planning 
documents.   
Participants playing the role of the buyer were randomly assigned to a mimicry condition or 
a control condition.  All participants assigned to play the role of the seller were assigned to the 
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control condition.  This was done because, although the key to getting a deal in this exercise largely 
hinges on sellers revealing their underlying interests for selling the station, it is the onus of the 
buyer to make the seller comfortable enough to reveal this information, understand the seller’s 
needs, and structure a deal to accommodate the seller’s interests.  If the buyer does not elicit this 
information, does not understand the seller’s interests, or is unwilling to accommodate them, a deal 
is unlikely to be reached.  Because results from Study 1 imply that the mimicking party has an 
advantage in extracting information from the other party, we thought it was more important for the 
buyer to mimic the seller in this negotiation. 
Outcome measure. The main dependent measure was whether participants were able to 
negotiate a deal based on the parties’ interests that was allowable within the parameters of each 
party’s reservation price.  An outcome was considered an acceptable deal if the terms involved 1) a 
sale price not greater than the buyer’s reservation price, and 2) the addition of some type of extra 
issue(s), such as a job, where the value of the issue(s) could help the seller reach his/her reservation 
price.  Outcomes were considered unsuccessful if they involved only the sale price of the station 
(which indicated a disregard for one of the parties’ reservation prices), or if parties reached an 
impasse.1    
Post-negotiation measures.  After the negotiation, participants completed a questionnaire to 
assess potential underlying psychological variables that could further explicate the facilitative 
effects of mimicry.  Participants answered the following questions on scales ranging from 1 (not at 
all) to 5 (very much): (a) How much did you trust the other party during the negotiation? (b) How 
much rapport did you feel with the other party during the negotiation? (c) How much did you like 
negotiating with the other person?  In addition, participants answered the same two manipulation 
check items that were used in Study 1.   
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
                                                                                             Mimicry and Negotiations 
 
15 
Results 
Manipulation checks.  All participants correctly recalled their important message 
instructions.  Participants in the mimicking condition reported that they followed their mimicking 
instructions an average of 42.47% of the time (SD = 21.24; responses ranged from 12% - 80%).   
Performance.  Overall 12 out of 31 dyads (38.7%) reached an acceptable deal in this 
exercise within the confines of the roles.2  We examined the percentage of deals achieved in dyads 
where the buyer mimicked versus dyads where the buyer did not mimic.  Ten of 15 dyads (67%) in 
which a buyer mimicked achieved a deal, whereas only 2 of 16 dyads (12.5%) reached a deal when 
the buyer did not mimic.  A chi-square analysis revealed that these percentages were significantly 
different, χ² (1, N = 31) = 9.57, p = .002 (see Figure 2). 
As in Study 1, we also investigated whether the actual amount of mimicking performed 
during the negotiation predicted whether a deal was reached.  We conducted a binary logistic 
regression analysis with percentage of time the buyer spent mimicking as our independent variable 
and presence or absence of a deal as our dependent variable.  Results indicated that amount of 
mimicking was a significant predictor of whether a deal was reached, Odds Ratio = 1.047, Wald 
test = 6.36, p = .012.  Thus, the more participants actually mimicked their opponents, the more 
likely they were to get a deal.  
The Mediating Role of Trust. We examined the effect of mimicking on each party’s 
ratings of trust, liking, and rapport for the other party.  We regressed each of the six post-
negotiation measures on the actual amount of mimicry that was performed in the negotiation.  
However, only one of the six variables was significantly predicted by the amount of mimicking 
performed by the buyer: the degree to which the seller trusted the buyer, F(1, 29) = 8.71, p = 
.006, β = .48 (all other p’s > .23).  We then tested whether seller trust mediated the relationship 
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between mimicry and deal-making (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  As noted above, buyer mimicry 
significantly predicted both deal-making and seller trust. However, the direct effect of mimicry 
on deal-making became non-significant when controlling for seller trust, Odds Ratio = 1.026, 
Wald test = 1.03, p = .312, whereas the effect of seller trust remained significant, Odds Ratio = 
17.49, Wald test = 6.97, p = .008.  A Sobel’s test confirmed that the mediational effect of seller 
trust was significant, z = 1.99, p = .047.  Thus, mimicry facilitated deal-making and this effect 
was mediated by the amount of trust the buyer (i.e., the mimicker) elicited from the seller (i.e., 
the mimickee). 
General Discussion 
The current research investigated the hypothesis that negotiators who strategically mimic 
their opponents’ overt behaviors secure better negotiation agreements than those who do not 
mimic.  In Study 1, strategic behavioral mimicry facilitated both individual and joint gains in a 
multi-issue employment negotiation.  The mimicking party directly benefited in terms of individual 
gain, although mimicry did not adversely affect the individual gain of the party being mimicked.  In 
Study 2, compared to negotiators who did not mimic, negotiators who mimicked their opponents’ 
mannerisms were more likely to create a deal that benefited both parties in a negotiation involving 
a negative bargaining zone.  Study 2 also obtained evidence that buyers who mimicked sellers 
elicited higher levels of trust, and that seller trust mediated the relationship between mimicry and 
deal-making.  Overall, our results suggest that mimicry can indeed have positive benefits in a very 
complex, mixed-motive interpersonal interaction such as a negotiation. 
It is important to point out that across both studies, none of the participants who were 
mimicked noticed that their opponents were copying their behaviors, suggesting that the effects of 
being mimicked occurred automatically and unconsciously.  In addition, it is compelling that our 
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effects emerged even when participants with no prior training in strategic mimicry received a brief 
instruction to mimic just prior to a very complex task that demanded substantial mental 
concentration; furthermore, these individuals’ primary goal during the interactions with their 
opponents was to achieve the best negotiation outcomes for themselves.  Thus, compared to most 
prior research that employed trained confederates engaging in simple tasks (e.g., Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999), the results from the current studies speak to the robustness of the ability of mimicry 
to facilitate interpersonal interactions, and in this instance, deal-making.  In addition, as far as the 
authors are aware, results from Study 2 offer the first evidence of an underlying, mediational 
mechanism between mimicry and a behavior outcome.  Thus, the current research not only 
demonstrates the robustness of mimicry’s ability to facilitate even complex types of interpersonal 
interactions, but also offers some insight into the underlying processes responsible for these 
benefits, namely instilling perceived trust of the mimicker. 
Although our results were consistent across two different types of negotiation tasks, future 
research is needed to determine the extent to which mimicry is an effective tool across a variety of 
negotiation contexts.  For example, future research should investigate whether mimicry helps 
resolve disputes or whether it helps mediators be more effective.  It stands to reason that mimicry 
might help defuse highly charged and emotional situations by helping participants feel more in 
sync with each other, thereby facilitating dispute resolution.  However, disputes are especially 
fraught with distrust and animosity, and would provide an interesting test of the potential boundary 
conditions of mimicry on negotiations. 
In addition, it is currently unclear whether mimicry can impact negotiations involving only 
distributive (i.e. zero-sum) issues with no opportunity for an integrative outcome.  The results from 
Study 1 suggest that mimicry is effective at increasing both individual and joint gain; however, this 
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negotiation involved multiple issues with multiple potential trade-offs between the two parties. In 
fact, the authors conducted an additional study investigating the effect of mimicry on a single issue, 
distributive negotiation exercise with 112 participants and 56 dyads (from a similar participant 
population – MBA students from the same university – as in Studies 1 and 2) and found that 
mimicry had no significant impact on outcomes.  Although results from a single study do not 
necessarily rule out the possibility that mimicry may be able to facilitate purely distributive 
negotiations, at present mimicry appears to be most effective in negotiations with integrative (i.e. 
win-win) potential. 
Related to the differential benefits of mimicry for distributive and integrative issues are the 
different effects of our mimicry manipulation on post-negotiation assessments of interpersonal 
trust, liking, and rapport.  In Study 2, trust emerged as an important mediating variable, a finding 
consistent with previous research that has found that trust is often a prerequisite for information 
sharing in negotiations (Butler, 1999; Kimmel, et al., 1980). Mimicry by the buyer may have 
imbued sellers (those being mimicked) with a sense that their opponent was trustworthy enough to 
share their private and sensitive information about reasons for selling.  Research should continue to 
explore whether trust is the critical interpersonal factor in other negotiations involving mimicking, 
or if the underlying psychological variables change depending on the dynamics and structure of a 
given negotiation.   
 The results of the current research demonstrate that mimicking can be a highly effective tool 
in negotiations.  Negotiators often leave considerable value on the table, mainly because they feel 
reluctant to share information with their opponent due to their fears of exploitation.  Yet building 
trust and sharing information greatly increases the probability that a win-win outcome will be 
reached (Bazerman & Neale, 1992).  Our research suggests that mimicking is one way to facilitate 
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building trust and, consequently, information sharing in a negotiation.  By creating trust in and 
soliciting information from their opponent, mimickers bake bigger pies at the bargaining table, and 
consequently take a larger share of that pie for themselves.  
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1: Individual gain (in points) as a function of experimental condition, Study 1. 
Figure 2: Percentage of deals as a function of whether the buyer mimicked the seller, Study 
2.
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1
 We considered the actual terms of the deal of less importance than the presence of an 
interest-based deal itself.  
 
2
 Of the 19 dyads that did not achieve an acceptable deal, 10 reached an impasse, 8 
reached a deal below the seller’s reservation price, and 1 reached a deal that would have 
been illegal. 
 
